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Modernity in Antiquity: Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy in Heidegger and Arendt 
Jussi Backman (University of Jyväskylä) 
 
This article looks at the role of Hellenistic thought in the historical narratives of Martin Heidegger and 
Hannah Arendt. To a certain extent, both see—with G. W. F. Hegel, J. G. Droysen, and Eduard 
Zeller—Hellenistic and Roman philosophy as a “modernity in antiquity,” but with important differences. 
Heidegger is generally dismissive of Hellenistic thought and comes to see it as a decisive historical turning 
point at which a protomodern element of subjective willing and domination is injected into the classical 
heritage of Plato and Aristotle. Arendt, likewise, credits Stoic philosophy with the discovery of the will 
as an active faculty constituting a realm of subjective freedom and autonomy. While she considers 
Hellenistic philosophy as essentially apolitical and world-alienated—in contrast to the inherently political 
and practical Roman culture—it nonetheless holds for her an important but unexploited ethical and 
political potential. 
 
L’article examine le rôle de la pensée hellénistique dans les récits historiques de Martin Heidegger et 
Hannah Arendt. Dans une certaine mesure, tous les deux voient, avec G. W. F. Hegel, J. G. Droysen 
et Eduard Zeller, la philosophie hellénistique et romaine comme une « modernité dans l’antiquité », mais 
avec des différences importantes. Généralement, Heidegger dédaigne la philosophie hellénistique et finit 
par la considérer comme un tournant historique décisif qui introduit un élément protomoderne de volonté 
et de domination subjective dans l’héritage de Platon et Aristote. De même, Arendt attribue à la 
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philosophie stoïque la découverte de la volonté en tant que faculté active constituant un domaine de liberté 
et d’autonomie subjectives. Même si elle considère la philosophie hellénistique comme fondamentalement 
apolitique et aliénée du monde—à l’inverse du caractère fondamentalement politique et pratique de la 
culture romaine—cette pensée détient néanmoins pour elle un potentiel éthico-politique important et sous-
exploité. 
 
1. The Invention of Hellenism as Protomodernity: Droysen, Hegel, Zeller 
In a preface to the 1843 edition of his Geschichte des Hellenismus, Johann Gustav Droysen notes that 
the period between the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE and the Battle of Actium in 31 
BCE—a political and cultural epoch for which he introduces the term “Hellenism”—was generally 
regarded as “a great gap, as a dead spot in the history of humanity, as a loathsome deposit of all kinds 
of degeneracy, putrefaction, lifelessness.”1 In the eyes of the classicists of Droysen’s day, the three 
centuries separating the classical era of the Greek polis from the classical era of Latin literature were, 
at best, an intermediary age of imitation, conservation, and dissemination of classical culture. In 
contrast to this notion of Hellenism as a “medieval period of antiquity,” Droysen portrays it as a 
“vital link in the chain of human development”—as the “modern age of antiquity” (moderne Zeit des 
Altertums), an age of disenchantment and loss of cultural innocence, but also one of great political 
and intellectual progress.2 
 
I thank the guest editors Frederik Bakker, Antonio Cimino, and Elena Nicoli for the opportunity to contribute, and Ville 
Suuronen and the anonymous referees for wonderfully helpful comments. Financial support was provided by my 
Academy of Finland research project, Creation, Genius, Innovation: Towards a Conceptual Genealogy of Western 
Creativity (2018–23; decision number 317276). 
1 Johann Gustav Droysen, “Vorwort zur Geschichte des Hellenismus II” [1843], in Kleine Schriften zur alten Geschichte, 
Vol. 1 (Leipzig: Veit & Co., 1893), 300. Cf. Jürgen Busche, “Hellenismus,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 
Vol. 3, (ed.) J. Ritter (Basle: Schwabe & Co., 1974), 1050–53. 
2 Droysen, “Vorwort,” 299–300, 307–308, 313. 
3 
 
The perception of Hellenism as an intermediate period of stagnation has also long applied to 
its philosophy.3 The Neoplatonism of the late imperial age bolstered the canonic supremacy of Plato 
and Aristotle. Of the main Hellenistic schools of thought, Epicureanism, with its materialist ontology 
and hedonistic ethics, was outright rejected by pagan and Christian Neoplatonism. The philosophical 
ideals of the ancient skeptics were equally incompatible with the emerging alliance between 
philosophy and theology, in the service of which individual skeptical arguments found at most an 
instrumental role.4 Stoic ethics and ontology were more favourably received by Christian thinkers, 
but mainly because Stoic terms such as logos and pneuma had developed into a kind of intellectual 
lingua franca of the Roman world.5 By contrast, Renaissance humanists, for whom the works of Cicero, 
Epictetus, Seneca, and Sextus Empiricus again became standard reading, espoused a renewed lively 
interest in all aspects of Hellenistic thought, and the late medieval and early modern crisis of 
Aristotelianism and rational theology contributed to a revival and reappropriation of skepticism in 
the sixteenth century.6 Immanuel Kant, whose “Copernican Revolution” in many ways made modern 
skepticism redundant as a living philosophical movement, still shows a lively engagement with 
Hellenistic ethics.7  
 
3 For a concise overview of the reception of Hellenistic philosophy in the later tradition, see A. A. Long, Hellenistic 
Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 232–48. 
4 See Charles Bolyard, “Medieval Skepticism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), (ed.) E. 
N. Zalta, [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/skepticism-medieval/], accessed June 25, 2019. 
5 See Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, Vol. 2: Stoicism in Christian Latin 
Thought through the Sixth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1985). 
6 See J. Miller and B. Inwood, eds., Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003); Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 17–43. 
7 See Daniel Doyle and José M. Torralba, “Kant and Stoic Ethics,” in The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition, 
(ed.) J. Sellars (London: Routledge, 2016), 270–83. 
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It was G. W. F. Hegel, however, who, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, cemented the 
notion that Stoicism, Epicureanism, and skepticism constitute a separate and independent episode in 
ancient thought in which the individual “unhappy consciousness” seeks intellectual release from the 
alienating and oppressive external world of universal Roman imperialism.8 In Hellenistic philosophy, 
the initial harmony of consciousness with the world, its “being at home” characteristic of earlier 
Greek philosophy,9 is ruptured; “wisdom” (sophia) no longer means insight into the ideal structures 
of the world but becomes synonymous with the harmony of the individual with herself and her 
autonomy from the vicissitudes of the external world. Thus, Hegel, too, sees philosophical Hellenism 
as a kind of “modernity of antiquity”—as a dialectical move towards the self-reflective and 
autonomous modern subjectivity. Hegel’s view was echoed by Eduard Zeller in his extensive and 
highly influential history of Greek philosophy (1844–52), which portrays Hellenistic thought as a 
“withdrawal of the human being onto herself, her internal disposition, her own willing and thinking, 
the deepening of self-consciousness,” due to the loss of political freedom and amounting to “a 
restriction and isolation, and the loss of lively interest in the external world.”10 It is the Hegelian-
Zellerian reading that has, above all, shaped our contemporary understanding of Greek philosophy 
from Aristotle to Plotinus.11 
 
8 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Werke, Vol. 19: Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1986), 401–403, tr. by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson as Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Plato 
and the Platonists (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 371–73. 
9 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Werke, Vol. 18: Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 1, 2nd ed. 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993), 171–79, tr. by E. S. Haldane as Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. 1: Greek 
Philosophy to Plato (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 149–55. 
10 Eduard Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Vol. 3.1: Die nacharistotelische 
Philosophie [1852], 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Fues, 1865), 18–19, tr. by O. J. Reichel as The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, 2nd 
ed. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1892), 25; trans. mod. 
11 For Heidegger’s remarks on Hegel’s and Zeller’s renderings of Greek philosophy, see Martin Heidegger, 
Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 22: Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie [1926], (ed.) F.-K. Blust (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 
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In what follows, I will not attempt to evaluate the historical adequacy of this reading, but will 
rather study some of its repercussions within Continental thought. I will first show that the role 
allotted to Hellenistic philosophy in what is perhaps the most philosophically ambitious narrative of 
the history of philosophy since Hegel—that of Heidegger—is thoroughly informed and shaped by 
the Hegelian approach. Even though some of the founding concepts of phenomenology were 
borrowed from Hellenistic thought (notably, Husserl’s concept of epochē12), Heidegger’s philosophical 
background in scholasticism and in the tradition of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg and Franz 
Brentano, whose doctoral dissertation On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle (1862) he claims to have 
read while in grammar school,13 gave his historical orientation a strongly Aristotelian focus. From his 
very earliest lecture courses, Heidegger sees the post-Aristotelian neglect of the question concerning 
being qua being as an immediate decline and deterioration. While he showed some interest in 
Augustine and Neoplatonism,14 the centuries following Aristotle’s death appear to have remained for 
him a kind of philosophical lacuna. Moreover, his engagement with Nietzsche in the 1930s leads him 
to regard the “Romanization” of Greek philosophy as a profound transformation that inserts a 
 
1993), 22, tr. by R. Rojcewicz as Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 
18. Page references, separated by a slash, will be first to the German original, then to the English translation. 
12 On the Heideggerian use of the term epochē, see Martin Heidegger, “Der Spruch des Anaximander” [1946], in 
Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 5: Holzwege [1935–46], (ed.) F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977), 337–38, tr. by 
J. Young and K. Haynes as “Anaximander’s Saying,” in Off the Beaten Track (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 254. Page references, separated by a slash, will be first to the German original, then to the English translation. 
13 Martin Heidegger, “Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie” [1963], in Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 14: Zur Sache des Denkens, 
(ed.) F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2007), 93, tr. by J. Stambaugh as “My Way to Phenomenology,” in 
On Time and Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 74. 
14 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 60: Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens [1920–21], (ed.) M. Jung, T. 
Regehly, and C. Strube (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1995), 157–299, tr. by M. Fritsch and J. Gosetti-Ferencei as The 
Phenomenology of Religious Life (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 113–227. Page references, separated 
by a slash, will be first to the German original, then to the English translation. 
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protomodern and prototechnical element of willing, domination, and manipulation into the heritage 
of Plato and Aristotle. To this extent, Hellenistic-Roman philosophy is, for Heidegger, as it was for 
Hegel and Droysen, a modernity within antiquity. 
Heidegger’s lectures on Plato and Aristotle in the 1920s were perhaps the most immediately 
influential part of his teaching activities, as is shown by the strong focus on Greek philosophy among 
his students, including Karl Löwith, Helene Weiss, Jacob Klein, Leo Strauss, Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Hans Jonas, and Hannah Arendt. To be sure, none of these accepted Heidegger’s readings of Greek 
thought uncritically and all went in some respect beyond him in terms of classical scholarship. Yet 
among Heidegger’s philosophical heirs, only Jonas, with his studies of Gnosticism and late 
antiquity,15 and Arendt came up with independent and positive evaluations of Hellenistic and Roman 
thought16—Rémi Brague mentions Arendt as a “very brilliant exception” to the generally depreciating 
evaluation of Roman experience in Heidegger and the entire modern philosophical tradition.17 I will 
show that in Arendt’s view, Roman political ideals—which never really assumed the form of a 
political philosophy—were based on an “antimodern” reverence for tradition and authority that, 
paradoxically, provided a classical model for the great modern political revolutions. On the other 
hand, Arendt’s reading of Stoicism—of Epictetus, in particular—to a certain extent adopts 
Heidegger’s view of Roman Hellenistic philosophy as a key prelude to the modern metaphysics of 
 
15 Hans Jonas, Der Begriff der Gnosis (Göttingen: Hubert, 1930); Augustin und das paulinische Freiheitsproblem: Ein 
philosophischer Beitrag zur Genesis der christlich-abendländischen Freiheitsidee (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1930); Gnosis und spätantiker Geist, Vol. 1–2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1934–54); The Gnostic Religion: 
The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958). 
16 On Heidegger’s most prominent Jewish pupils, see Richard Wolin, Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, 
Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); see in particular 70–100, where Wolin 
also points to the importance of Stoicism for Löwith. 
17 Rémi Brague, Europe, la voie romaine (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 44–45, tr. by S. Lester as Eccentric Culture: A Theory 
of Western Civilization (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002), 30–31.  
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the willing subject. Unlike Heidegger, however, Arendt assigns key originality and ethico-political 
importance to this Stoic discovery of the autonomy of the will as an entirely independent function 
of thinking.18 
 
 
18 That Roman thought is for both Heidegger and Arendt a prelude to modernity is also suggested by Eliane Escoubas, 
“L’exposition du ‘qui’: La cité grecque chez H. Arendt et M. Heidegger,” Kairos, vol. 2 (1991): 51–68, especially 59. 
For further discussions of Heidegger’s and Arendt’s relationship to Hellenistic and Roman thought, see Eliane Escoubas, 
“Heidegger, la question romaine, la question impériale: Autour du ‘Tournant’,” in Heidegger: Questions ouvertes, (ed.) 
M. Richir and E. Escoubas (Paris: Osiris, 1987); Barbara Cassin, “Grecs et romains: Les paradigmes de l’antiquité chez 
Arendt et Heidegger,” in Ontologie et politique: Hannah Arendt, (ed.) M. Abensour et al. (Paris: Tierce, 1989), tr. by J. 
Barnes as “Greeks and Romans: Paradigms of the Past in Arendt and Heidegger,” Comparative Civilizations Review, vol. 
22, no. 22 (1990): 28–53; Franco Chiereghin, “Der griechische Anfang Europas und die Frage der Romanitas: Der Weg 
Heideggers zu einem anderen Anfang,” in Europa und die Philosophie, (ed.) H.-H. Gander (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 
1993); Jacques Taminiaux, “Athens and Rome,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, (ed.) D. Villa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Franco Volpi, “Heidegger et la romanité philosophique,” Revue de 
métaphysique et de morale, vol. 31, no. 3 (2001): 287–300; Kosmas Raspitsos, Die Latinisierung des Griechischen: 
Übersetzung, Verstehen und Sprache im Ausgang von Martin Heidegger und Hans-Georg Gadamer (Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann, 2013); Golfo Maggini, “Europe’s Double Origin: ‘The Greek’ and ‘The Roman’ in Hannah 
Arendt’s Phenomenological Genealogy of Europe,” Phenomenology and Mind, vol. 8 (2015): 224–37; Joy Connolly, 
“The Promise of the Classical Canon: Hannah Arendt and the Romans,” Classical Philology, vol. 113, no. 1 (2018): 6–
19; Andrew Benjamin, “Redressing the Metaphysics of Nudity: Notes on Seneca, Arendt, and Dignity,” Classical 
Philology, vol. 113, no. 1 (2018): 39–52. For general comparative studies of Heidegger and Arendt, see Jacques 
Taminiaux, La fille de Thrace et le penseur professional: Arendt et Heidegger (Paris: Payot, 1992), tr. by M. Gendre as 
The Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker: Arendt and Heidegger (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997); Dana R. Villa, 
Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). Page references for 
Cassin’s article, separated by a slash, will be first to the French original, then to the English translation. 
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2. Heidegger and the Romanization of the Greek Beginning 
In Heidegger’s early work—his lecture courses and writings from 1919–32 belonging to the context 
of the fundamental ontology of Being and Time—the historical narrative is heavily focused on 
Aristotle, to whose works a considerable part of Heidegger’s efforts were dedicated. As Theodore 
Kisiel has shown in detail,19 the project of fundamental ontology initially emerged from an earlier 
project that Heidegger, in a research plan from 1922, designated with the working title 
“Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle.”20 For the earlier Heidegger, it is in 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics that the Greek approach to the question concerning the being of beings—
being qua being, to on hē on—reaches its culmination. Pre-Socratic and Platonic thought are seen first 
and foremost as a preparation for the Aristotelian take on the question, which Heidegger seeks to 
reappropriate in terms of a temporal elaboration of Dasein’s understanding of being.  
Accordingly, post-Aristotelian philosophy represents, for Heidegger, mainly an obfuscation 
and oblivion of Aristotle’s ontological achievements. From this period, we find in Heidegger only a 
handful of sporadic and generally disparaging references to Hellenistic thought, which he 
characterizes as “essentially practical” and as subjugating science to the “service of immediate life.”21 
 
19 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
20 Martin Heidegger, “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)” 
[1922], in Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 62: Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles 
zur Ontologie und Logik, (ed.) G. Neumann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2005), 341–419, tr. by J. Veith as “Indication of 
the Hermeneutical Situation,” in The Heidegger Reader, (ed.) G. Figal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 
38–61. 
21 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 56/57: Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie [1919], 2nd ed., (ed.) B. Heimbüchel 
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1999), 18, tr. by T. Sadler as Towards the Definition of Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2008), 
17. 
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Hellenism “flattens out” classical concepts such as logos or theōria22 and consists in an essentially 
“scholastic” (schulmässig) compilation of past work under pedagogical titles such as “logic.”23 As such, 
Hellenism amounts to a “decline, weakening, and deformation of scientific philosophy through 
world-views and religion”;24 it is an era in which the “questionable and open nature of the central 
 
22 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 63: Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität) [1923], (ed.) K. Bröcker-Oltmanns 
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1988), 21–22, tr. by J. van Buren as Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1999), 17; Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 27: Einleitung in die Philosophie [1928–29], (ed.) 
O. Saame and I. Saame-Speidel (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1996), 169–70; Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 40: 
Einführung in die Metaphysik [1935], (ed.) P. Jaeger (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983), 135–36, 143, tr. by G. Fried and R. 
Polt as Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 133–34, 143. Page references, separated 
by a slash, will be first to the German original, then to the English translation. 
23 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 18: Die Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie [1924], (ed.) M. 
Michalski (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2002), 9, tr. by R. D. Metcalf and M. B. Tanzer as Basic Concepts of Aristotelian 
Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 9; Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 21: Logik: Die Frage 
nach der Wahrheit [1925–26], (ed.) W. Biemel (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), 4–5, tr. by T. Sheehan as Logic: The 
Question of Truth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 3–5; Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 25: 
Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft [1927–28], 3rd ed., (ed.) I. Görland (Frankfurt: 
Klostermann, 1995), 11, tr. by P. Emad and K. Maly as Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 8; Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 26: Metaphysische 
Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz [1928], (ed.) K. Held (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), 4, tr. by M. 
Heim as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 4; Heidegger, 
Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 29/30: Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt—Endlichkeit—Einsamkeit [1929–30], (ed.) F.-W. 
von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983), 53–56, tr. by W. McNeill and N. Walker as The Fundamental Concepts 
of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 35–37; Heidegger, 
Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 55: Heraklit [1943–44], 3rd ed., (ed.) M. S. Frings (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1994), 225–28, tr. by 
J. G. Assaiante and S. M. Ewegen as Heraclitus: The Inception of Occidental Thinking and Logic: Heraclitus’ Doctrine 
of the Logos (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 171–73. Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 29/30 is hereafter referred to 
parenthetically in the text as GA 29/30. Page references, separated by a slash, will be first to the German original, then to 
the English translation. 
24 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 22, 21/17. 
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problems left by Plato and Aristotle” is lost25 and “living questioning dies out” (GA 29/30, 53/35). 
In particular, the centuries during which Aristotle’s technical or “esoteric” works were mostly 
inaccessible until their alleged compilation by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century BCE are to 
be regarded as a “decline of ancient philosophy” (ibid., 56/37).26 The few Hellenistic contributions 
cited by Heidegger, such as the Stoic theory of affects, are denied any real originality with regard to 
Aristotle.27 While Heidegger draws on the early Christian “experience of factical life” as expressed in 
the Pauline epistles,28 he blames the introduction of systematic Christian theology for the relegation 
of philosophy to a position of subservience to a religious “worldview” (ibid., 63–65/42–43, 68–
69/45).29 The earlier Heidegger’s stance on Greek philosophy after Aristotle is summed up in his 
1926 course on ancient philosophy (which, in a characteristic way, only discusses the Pre-Socratics, 
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle):  
 
 
25 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 3: Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik [1929], (ed.) F.-W. von Herrmann 
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1991), 8, tr. by R. Taft as Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), 5. 
26 It should be noted that Heidegger sees in Neoplatonism, by contrast, a certain “reappropriation of the scientific [i.e., 
Platonic-Aristotelian] epoch”; Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 22, 21/17. 
27 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 20: Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs [1925], (ed.) P. Jaeger 
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979), 393, 418–20, tr. by T. Kisiel as History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 284–85, 302–303; Heidegger, Sein und Zeit [1927], 18th ed. (Tübingen: 
Niemeyer, 2001), 139, 199, tr. by J. Stambaugh as Being and Time, (tr. revised) D. J. Schmidt (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2010), 135, 192. 
28 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 60, 67–156/47–111. 
29 See also Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 19: Platon: Sophistes [1924–25], (ed.) I. Schüßler (Frankfurt: 
Klostermann, 1992), 254–56, tr. by R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer as Plato’s Sophist (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1997), 175–77; Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 27, 389. 
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Scientific apex of ancient philosophy: Aristotle. He did not solve all problems, but he advanced 
to the limits which Greek philosophy could reach, given its general approach and its 
problematics. He unified in a positive way the fundamental motifs of the previous philosophy; 
after him, a decline.30 
 
In the early 1930s, this narrative is somewhat modified as Plato is designated as the founder of 
hierarchical “ontotheological” metaphysics and the Pre-Socratics—first and foremost, Anaximander, 
Heraclitus, and Parmenides—are allotted a more independent role as pre- or protometaphysical 
thinkers of the “first beginning” or “inception” (Anfang) of Western philosophical thought.31 
 
30 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 22, 22/18. See also Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 23: Geschichte der 
Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis Kant [1926–27], (ed.) H. Vetter (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2006), 3; GA 29/30, 
53/35. 
31 Heidegger’s concept of “ontotheology” makes its first appearance in his 1930–31 course on Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit; Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 32: Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes [1930–31], 3rd ed., (ed.) I. 
Görland (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1997), 140–46, tr. by P. Emad and K. Maly as Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 97–101. The notion of Plato, especially of the Platonic Idea of the Good, 
as the foundation of Western metaphysics proper emerges in the 1931–32 course on the Republic and the Theaetetus; 
Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 34: Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet [1931–32], 2nd 
ed., (ed.) H. Mörchen (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1997), 100–12, 173, 327–28, 331, tr. by T. Sadler as The Essence of 
Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus (London: Continuum, 2002), 73–81, 126, 233–34, 236. Heidegger’s 
renewed interest in the Pre-Socratics as a “first” or “initial” beginning or “inception” (Anfang) of Western philosophy 
first becomes evident in his 1932 course on Anaximander and Parmenides; Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 35: Der 
Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie: Auslegung des Anaximander und Parmenides [1932], (ed.) P. Trawny 
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2012), 48, 97–100, tr. by R. Rojcewicz as The Beginning of Western Philosophy: Interpretation 
of Anaximander and Parmenides (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 37, 74–76.  
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Nonetheless, Aristotle retains his position as the “first end of the first inception,” as the culmination 
of the development ensuing from the Pre-Socratic beginning.32 
 
The great begins great, sustains itself only through the free recurrence of greatness, and if it is 
great, also comes to an end in greatness. So it is with the philosophy of the Greeks. It came to 
an end in greatness with Aristotle.33 
 
In the mid-1930s, Heidegger begins to associate the Hellenistic decline of Greek philosophy 
with the Romanization and Latinization of Greek thought. The process of translation into Latin 
which became so formative for Christian, medieval, and ultimately modern philosophy, Heidegger 
emphasizes here, was nothing “arbitrary and innocuous” but rather “the first stage in the cordoning 
off and alienation of the originary essence of Greek philosophy.”34 “Roman thinking takes over the Greek 
words without the corresponding and equiprimordial experience of what they say, without the Greek word.”35 It is 
 
32 On Aristotle as the “first end of the first inception,” see Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 65: Beiträge zur 
Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) [1936–38], (ed.) F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1989), 211, tr. by R. 
Rojcewicz and D. Vallega-Neu as Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2012), 165; Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 68: Hegel [1938–42], (ed.) I. Schüßler (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1993), 50, 
tr. by J. Arel and N. Feuerhahn as Hegel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 40. Page references, separated 
by a slash, will be first to the German original, then to the English translation. 
33 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 40, 18/17. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 45: Grundfragen der 
Philosophie: Ausgewählte “Probleme” der “Logik” [1937–38], (ed.) F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 
1984), 220–21, tr. by R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer as Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic” 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 184–85. Page references, separated by a slash, will be first to the German 
original, then to the English translation. 
34 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 40, 16/14. Cf. Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 45, 68–69/62, 100/89, 105/93. 
35 Heidegger, “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” (“The Origin of the Work of Art”) [1935–36], in Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 5, 
8/6. 
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here, in the Roman and Christian reappropriation of the Greek legacy, that the great transformation 
of what Heidegger sees as the essence of Greek thought—namely, the determination of the human 
being in terms of being—into the modern determination of being in terms of self-conscious 
subjectivity sets in motion. This process of metaphysical modernization has thus been underway “not 
only since modernity but since late antiquity and since the rise of Christianity.”36 As Heidegger plainly 
puts it in his 1938–40 monograph The History of Beyng (Die Geschichte des Seyns),  
 
The first metaphysical, yet still concealed beginning [Beginn] of modern subjectivity is already 
found in the Christian, Augustinian interpretation of the ideas; indeed earlier still in the 
Hellenistic, Roman “Stoic” distortion of the entire truth of Greek “being” [Seins].37  
 
Accordingly, the roots of the humanism—that is, anthropocentrism—of modern metaphysics go 
back to the Roman Republic, to the Ciceronian ideal of civilized humanitas whose roots, in turn, lie in 
Hellenistic notions of education, paideia. Renaissance humanism is thus first and foremost a renascentia 
romanitatis, a rebirth of Romanity.38  
The Christian doctrine of divine creation and the accompanying notion of reality as a realm of 
rational planning and projection is a precondition for the modern metaphysics of subjectivity and for 
 
36 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 40, 146/146. 
37 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 69: Die Geschichte des Seyns [1938–40], (ed.) P. Trawny (Frankfurt: 
Klostermann, 1998), 159, tr. by J. Powell and W. McNeill as The History of Beyng (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2015), 137. 
38 Martin Heidegger, “Brief über den ‘Humanismus’” [1946], in Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 9: Wegmarken [1919–61], (ed.) F.-
W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), 320, tr. by F. A. Capuzzi as “Letter on Humanism,” in Pathmarks, 
(ed.) W. McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 244. Page references, separated by a slash, will be 
first to the German original, then to the English translation. 
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the mathematization of nature that initializes the modern era.39 More generally speaking, as Heidegger 
explains in his 1941 essay “Metaphysics as the History of Being,” it is the alliance of “the politically 
imperial element of Romanness [Römertums], the Christian element of the Roman church, and the 
Romanic element [das Romanische]” that founds modernity by becoming “the origin of that 
fundamental structure of the modernly [neuzeitlich] experienced reality called cultura (‘culture’).”40 For 
Heidegger, the Latin translations of Greek concepts incorporate un-Greek, Roman, and “imperial” 
connotations of an actively produced and manipulated reality that signal the metaphysical emergence 
of the Christian divine creator as the primal cause of all things and, later, of the modern self-conscious 
human subject that relates all things to herself as objects and actively “cultivates” the human cultural 
world. As a result of this implicit metaphysical Romanization, 
 
all Western history since is in a manifold sense Roman, and never again Greek. Every 
subsequent reawakening of Greek antiquity is a Roman renovation of a Greece already 
reinterpreted in a Roman way. The Germanic character of the medieval period, too, is Roman 
in its metaphysical essence, because it is Christian. (GA 6.2, 413/13; trans. mod.) 
 
 
39 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 41: Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen 
Grundsätzen [1935–36], (ed.) P. Jaeger (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1984), 109–12, tr. by W. B. Barton, Jr. and V. Deutsch 
as What Is a Thing? (South Bend, IN: Gateway Editions, 1967), 109–11. Cf. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 65, 
132/104. 
40 Martin Heidegger, “Die Metaphysik als Geschichte des Seins” [1941], in Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 6.2: Nietzsche, Vol. 2 
[1939–41], (ed.) B. Schillbach (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1997), 412, tr. by J. Stambaugh as “Metaphysics as History of 
Being,” in The End of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 12–13; trans. mod. Hereafter referred to 
parenthetically in the text as GA 6.2. Page references, separated by a slash, will be first to the German original, then to 
the English translation. 
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Or, as Heidegger puts it in notes dating perhaps from the late 1930s, while Western metaphysics in 
his sense “unfolds” with Plato and Aristotle, it is “consolidated” and attains its essence only in 
Romanity.41  
Since the fundamental impetus of philosophical modernization is thus Roman and not Greek, 
and since Nietzsche’s metaphysics of the will to power is to be regarded as the completion and end 
of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity, Heidegger points out that it is only natural that Nietzsche 
should himself admit (in Twilight of the Idols) that the Greeks could never be for him what the Romans 
were.42 For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s “inverted Platonism” is still an extreme modern form of 
Platonism, animated not by a Greek but by a fundamentally Roman and Machiavellian voluntarism 
and imperialism (GA 6.2, 221/165).43  
These two Roman roots of modernity, voluntarism and imperialism, are closely interconnected. 
In Heidegger’s eyes, modern metaphysical voluntarism—the Schellingian and Nietzschean 
metaphysics of the will as the fundamental essence of subjectivity—is ultimately based on the Latin 
rendering of the Aristotelian energeia (“being-at-work” in the sense of being finalized and completely 
functional) as actus or actualitas (in the sense of the German Wirklichkeit, something actively “put into 
effect”) through which reality comes to be seen as the domain of divine creation and of human 
 
41 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 76: Leitgedanken zur Entstehung der Metaphysik, der neuzeitlichen 
Wissenschaft und der modernen Technik [ca. 1935–55], (ed.) C. Strube (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2009), 5. 
42 Heidegger, “Der europäische Nihilismus” [1940], in GA 6.2, 221, tr. by F. A. Capuzzi as “European Nihilism,” in 
Nietzsche, Vol. 4: Nihilism, (ed.) D. F. Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), 165. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Götzen-Dämmerung oder Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophirt [1889], in Kritische Studienausgabe, Vol. 6, 2nd ed., 
(ed.) G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), 155, tr. by J. Norman as Twilight of the Idols, or How To 
Philosophize with a Hammer, in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, (ed.) A. Ridley 
and J. Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 224–25. 
43 See also Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 96: Überlegungen XII–XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941), (ed.) P. 
Trawny (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2014), 199, tr. by R. Rojcewicz as Ponderings XII–XV: Black Notebooks 1939–1941 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017), 157. 
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activity (GA 6.2, 410–20/10–19).44 “The Romanization [Romanisierung] of this basic Greek 
metaphysical word [sc. energeia] enacts a completely uprooting reinterpretation of the concept of being 
in such a way that the Roman interpretation determines modern metaphysics.”45 It is in this Roman 
ontology of effectuation—implicit in the definition of cause (causa) as the ground of an effecting 
(ratio efficiendi) articulated by Cicero46—that the modern concept of causality, with its emphasis on the 
“efficient cause” whose role remains rather marginal among Aristotle’s four causes, is rooted.47  
 
44 See also Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 49: Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus [1941], (ed.) G. 
Seubold (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1991), 101; Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 70: Über den Anfang [1941], (ed.) P.-L. 
Coriando (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2005), 76; Heidegger, “Der Spruch des Anaximander,” 371/280; Heidegger, “Vom 
Wesen und Begriff der Physis: Aristoteles, Physik B, 1,” tr. by T. Sheehan as “On the Essence and Concept of Physis in 
Aristotle’s Physics B, 1” [1939], in Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 9, 286/218; Heidegger, “Hegel und die Griechen,” tr. by R. 
Metcalf as “Hegel and the Greeks” [1958], in Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 9, 437/330–31; Heidegger, “Seminar in Le Thor 
1968,” in Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 15: Seminare [1951–73], (ed.) C. Ochwadt (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1986), 311, tr. by 
A. Mitchell and F. Raffoul as “Seminar in Le Thor 1968,” in Four Seminars (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2003), 25. Cf. Raspitsos, Die Latinisierung des Griechischen, 17–23. 
It should be noted that the earliest Latin translations and commentaries of Aristotle, those of Marius Victorinus 
(fourth century CE) and Boethius (sixth century), use both opus/operatio, “being-operative,” and actus to render energeia; 
the former is arguably closer in sense to the root of the term—ergon, “work,” “function”—emphasizing “being-at-work” 
rather than “being-active.” See Kristell Trégo, “Substance, sujet, acte: La première reception latine d’Aristote: Marius 
Victorinus et Boèce,” Les Études philosophiques, vol. 101, no. 2 (2012): 233–56. Cf. Jean Beaufret, Dialogue avec 
Heidegger: Philosophie grecque (Paris: Minuit, 1973), 122–45, tr. by M. Sinclair as Dialogue with Heidegger: Greek 
Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 97–118, 150.  
45 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 66: Besinnung [1938–39], (ed.) F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 
1997), 195–96, tr. by P. Emad and T. Kalary as Mindfulness (London: Continuum, 2006), 172. 
46 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De partitione oratoria, in On the Orator, Book 3; On Fate; Stoic Paradoxes; Divisions of 
Oratory, (tr.) H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), 394, §110. 
47 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 10: Der Satz vom Grund [1955–56], (ed.) P. Jaeger (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 
1997), 147–51, tr. by R. Lilly as The Principle of Reason (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 99–101. 
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The “imperial” character of Roman thought is elaborated in greatest detail in Heidegger’s 
1942–43 Parmenides course, which presents his most extensive account of the “Romanization” 
(Romanisierung) of Greek philosophy as a “transformation of the essence of truth and being.”48 
Empire, imperium, is literally a domain under command (impero) and domination (dominium, lordship), 
that is, subject to planning (impero comes from in + paro, “prepare, make provisions”).49 Referring to 
the sense of the Roman term for divinity, numen, as divine will, and to Roman ius, right or justice, as 
a cognate of iubeo, “to command, to order,” Heidegger underlines the imperative and dominant 
nature of Roman conceptuality, reflected in the Latin antonym for truth, falsum, the false, the 
deceptive in the sense of tripping or causing to fall (fallo, “to deceive”), derailing, cheating (GA 54, 
57–67/39–45).50 In contrast to the Greek alētheia, literally “unconcealment,” the Latin term for truth, 
veritas—which Heidegger debatably asserts to be a cognate of aperio, “to open,” and operio, “to cover,” 
deriving from the Proto-Indo-European root *wer-, “to cover, enclose, protect” (ibid., 69–71/47–
48)51—would mean precisely that which is closed, shut off, secured and ascertained against downfall 
and defeat. Verum, the true, is fundamentally equivalent to rectum, the upright, the straight. This 
alleged Roman connection between truth and uprightness thus serves to consolidate the 
understanding of truth as correctness (orthotēs, rectitudo), as correct directedness of the intellect to 
reality and correspondence or equivalence (homoiōsis, adaequatio) to things as they are, the roots of 
 
48 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 54: Parmenides [1942–43], 2nd ed., (ed.) M. S. Frings (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 
1992), 62, tr. by A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewicz as Parmenides (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 42. 
Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as GA 54. Page references, separated by a slash, will be first to the German 
original, then to the English translation. Cf. Escoubas, “Heidegger, la question romaine”; Cassin, “Grecs et romains,” 22–
26/33–38. 
49 Michiel de Vaan, Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the Other Italic Languages (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 446–47. 
50 Cf. de Vaan, Etymological Dictionary of Latin, 199–200. 
51 See de Vaan, Etymological Dictionary of Latin, 46, 668, where he supports the derivation of aperio from PIE *wer-, 
“to cover,” but derives veritas from a similar but different Proto-Indo-European root which originally designated “truth.” 
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which Heidegger traces to Plato. Through the influence of Roman imperial thought and Judeo-
Christian religiosity, this correctness then becomes understood as an orientation towards the ultimate 
truth—God the creator as the ultimate source of all beings—and thereby intertwined with moral 
justification (iustificatio, Rechtfertigung) as conformity to divine commands and as receptivity to divine 
grace (ibid., 67–79/45–54). The point of this complex genealogy is to uncover the “Roman” essence 
of Nietzsche’s notion of “justice” or “righteousness” (Gerechtigkeit) as conformity to the imperatives 
of the will to power, understood metaphysically as the fundamental and constitutive meaning-
generating dynamic of all reality—and, thus, to disclose the “Roman” lineage of modern metaphysics 
as a whole. 
 
Truth is, in the West, veritas. The true is that which, on various grounds, is self-asserting, 
remains above, and comes from above; that is, it is the command. But the “above,” the 
“supreme,” and the “lord” of lordship may appear in different forms. For Christianity, “the 
Lord” is God. “The lord” is also “reason.” “The lord” is the “world-spirit.” “The lord” is “the 
will to power.” And the will to power, as expressly determined by Nietzsche, is in essence 
command. In the age in which the modern period finds its completion in a historical total state 
of the earth, the Roman essence of truth, veritas as rectitudo and iustitia, appears as 
“righteousness” [Gerechtigkeit]…. The Roman veritas has become the “righteousness” of the will 
to power. The circle of the history of the essence of truth, as metaphysically experienced, is 
now closed. (Ibid., 77–78/53; trans. mod.)  
 
According to this narrative, in modernity, “righteousness” as orientation towards and 
compliance with the transcendent divine will is “secularized” into orientation towards and 
compliance with the essence of one’s own immanent subjectivity. The divine creator as the ultimate 
truth is replaced by subjectivity in the form of the Hegelian world-spirit or the Nietzschean will to 
power. Accordingly, since Descartes, self-consciousness becomes the path of access to the ultimate 
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truth, the most indubitable, secure, and unfailing perspective that admits of no falsity, deception, or 
error whatsoever—that is, the ultimate form of certainty which, in the metaphysical heritage of the 
Roman veritas, emerges as the essential criterion of truth (GA 6.2, 421–29/19–26). The “completion 
of the Roman essence of truth” as certainty, in the metaphysics of Hegel and Nietzsche, constitutes 
the “proper and hidden historical meaning of the nineteenth century” as the century of the 
completion and end of metaphysical modernity (GA 54, 86/58). In the age of total technical 
manipulation and mastery of things ushered in by this completion of metaphysics, the implicit 
protomodernity of Hellenistic-Roman thought fully unfolds.52  
 
3. Arendt and the Roman Discovery of the Will 
Arendt’s philosophical debt to Heidegger has often been exaggerated. As a student, she only spent 
three semesters in Marburg in 1924–26, attending three of Heidegger’s lecture courses as well as 
several of his seminars.53 Karl Jaspers, with whom she finished her dissertation, was a more important 
 
52 It should be noted that as Jean-François Mattéi has pointed out, the later Heidegger’s famous figure of the “fourfold” 
(Geviert) of sky, earth, mortals, and divinities, intended as a postmetaphysical alternative to the “enframing” or “setup” 
(Gestell) configuring the technical world, seems to have been borrowed from the Stoic understanding of the kosmos as a 
composition (systēma) of the sky, the earth, gods, and human beings, attributed by Diogenes Laertius to Posidonius and 
by Joannes Stobaeus to Chrysippus of Soli, but prefigured already in Plato’s Gorgias. See Jean-François Mattéi, 
Heidegger et Hölderlin: Le quadriparti (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001), 18–19; Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 
philosophorum, Vol. 2, (ed.) H. S. Long (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 7.138; Joannes Stobaeus, Anthologium, Vol. 1, 
(ed.) C. Wachsmuth (Berlin: Weidmann, 1884), 1.21.5; Plato, Gorgias, in Platonis opera, Vol. 3, (ed.) J. Burnet (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1903), 507e6–508a4. Heidegger himself refers, in passing, to this conception of the kosmos; Martin 
Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 42: Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809) [1936], (ed.) I. Schüßler 
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1988), 46, tr. by J. Stambaugh as Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985), 26.  
53 The lecture courses personally attended by Arendt were Plato’s Sophist (1924), History of the Concept of Time: 
Prolegomena (1924–25), and Logic: The Question of Truth (1925). She also attended Heidegger’s seminars on 
20 
 
intellectual and moral influence,54 and in many ways, Arendt was also an intellectual autodidact. 
During the most formative years of her independent career, her contact with Heidegger was broken. 
Nonetheless, there are two main aspects of Heidegger’s work which appear to have had a particular 
impact on her. In 1969 she recalls the electrifying effect of the earlier Heidegger’s phenomenological 
readings of ancient philosophy, which she was able to follow in situ in the context of his 1924–25 
course on Plato’s Sophist and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.55 In the same text, she also points to the 
discovery of Nietzsche’s will to power as the culmination of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity 
 
Descartes’s Meditations, Hegel’s Logic, and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. See Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, 
Briefe 1925–1975 und andere Zeugnisse, 3rd ed., (ed.) U. Ludz (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2002), 27, 48, 50, 268, 276, tr. 
by A. Shields as Letters 1925–1975 (Orlando: Harcourt, 2004), 18, 35, 37, 222–23, 228. Page references, separated by a 
slash, will be first to the German original, then to the English translation. 
54 For indications of Jaspers’s manifold influence on Arendt, especially in his activity as a public thinker, see Hannah 
Arendt, “What Is Existential Philosophy?” [1946/48] and “Dedication to Karl Jaspers” [1948], (tr.) Robert and Rita 
Kimber, and “Concern with Politics in Recent European Thought” [1954], in Essays in Understanding 1930–1954: 
Formation, Exile, Totalitarianism, (ed.) J. Kohn (New York: Schocken, 1994), 182–87, 212–16, 428–47; Arendt, “Karl 
Jaspers: A Laudatio” [1958], (tr.) C. Winston and R. Winston, and “Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World?” [1957], in Men 
in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968), 71–94. Cf. Lewis P. Hinchman and Sandra K. 
Hinchman, “Existentialism Politicized: Arendt’s Debt to Jaspers,” in Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays, (ed.) L. P. 
Hinchman and S. K. Hinchman (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 143–78. 
In the present context, it is interesting to note that in the introduction to his unfinished grand history of philosophy, 
The Great Philosophers (1957; the English edition was edited by Arendt), Jaspers abandons the standard classification of 
philosophers according to historical epochs and specifically points to the “Hellenistic age,” traditionally deemed an 
“unfertile and subordinate” period, as a questionable construction of an “educated class”; Karl Jaspers, Die grossen 
Philosophen, Vol. 1 (Munich: Piper, 1957), 43, tr. by R. Burch, F. Hild, and H. Wautischer as “Introduction to The Great 
Philosophers,” Existenz, vol. 12, no. 1 (2017): 13–49, here 21.  
55 Arendt and Heidegger, Briefe 1925–1975, 191/161. 
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as the later Heidegger’s key insight;56 this insight is studied in detail by Arendt in the second volume 
of The Life of the Mind.57 
The first Heideggerian element in Arendt’s thought—the tendency to understand our present 
modes of thinking and conceptualizing in terms of the entire Western philosophical tradition and the 
attempt to trace this tradition phenomenologically back to the original Greek experiences underlying 
it, first and foremost as articulated by Plato and Aristotle—is manifested already in Arendt’s 1929 
doctoral dissertation on love in Augustine, even though her choice of topic already here manifests 
her predilection for Roman thought. Here, Arendt seeks to “make explicit what Augustine himself 
merely implied” and to “grasp what lies beneath” the contradictions in Augustine’s text, rather than 
integrate them into a coherent system.58 The same phenomenological-hermeneutic approach 
underpins the quest, in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), to identify “the subterranean stream of 
Western history [that] has finally come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition,”59 
continued in the historical analysis of The Human Condition (1958) aiming to “trace back modern world 
alienation…to its origins.”60 The latter work explicitly focusses on Greek political thought, portraying 
twentieth-century totalitarianism as a manifestation of the “murderous consequences” inherent in 
the “degradation of politics into a means to obtain an allegedly ‘higher’ end,” a tendency which, 
according to Arendt’s account, characterizes the entire tradition of Western political philosophy since 
 
56 Ibid. 
57 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2: Willing (San Diego: Harcourt, 1981), 172–94. Hereafter referred to 
parenthetically in the text as LOTM 2. 
58 Hannah Arendt, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin: Versuch einer philosophischen Interpretation (Berlin: Springer, 1929), 
2, 6, tr. by J. Vecchiarelli Scott and J. Chelius Stark as Love and St. Augustine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996), 4, 7. 
59 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism [1951], 3rd ed. (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1979), ix. 
60 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition [1958], 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 6. Hereafter 
referred to parenthetically in the text as HC. 
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Plato and Aristotle (HC, 229). While the “prephilosophical” political culture embodied by Pericles 
saw the polis as an egalitarian public realm of free and spontaneous speech and action evaluated not 
in terms of its results but of its inherent, “aesthetic” quality and worth (ibid., 192–207), Plato’s Republic 
and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics regard politics mainly as an instrumental sphere of 
governance ultimately geared towards creating a framework for the philosophical life of 
contemplation as the most complete and self-sufficient form of human flourishing (ibid., 220–30). In 
a manner strongly reminiscent of the later Heidegger’s narrative of the Greek beginning and 
contemporary end of metaphysics, Arendt, in Between Past and Future (1961), describes the Western 
tradition of political philosophy as beginning with the Platonic attempt to impose philosophical 
standards upon public life and ending with the Marxist conversion of political philosophy into a 
revolutionary movement of social transformation.61 This end does not, however, signify an end to 
the “world-alienation” of political philosophy, but rather its culmination in ideological social 
engineering which, in its extreme totalitarian form, threatens to destroy the shared human world of 
common sense and tradition altogether. 
In spite of these affinities, there are certain elements in the Arendtian historical account that 
differ decisively from that of Heidegger. The narrative is neither unilinear nor monolithic; there are 
several important exceptions in the history of philosophy to the general alienation of philosophers 
from political action. The most notable of these exceptions are the Socratic ethics of conscience that 
Arendt discovers in Plato’s earlier dialogues62 as well as Kant’s Critique of Judgment, in which Arendt 
finds Kant’s true “political philosophy.”63 Both of these were to form the background for Arendt’s 
 
61 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought [1961], 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin, 
1993), 17–18. Cf. Arendt, The Promise of Politics, (ed.) J. Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2005), 81–92. 
62 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1: Thinking (San Diego: Harcourt, 1981), 166–93. Hereafter referred to 
parenthetically in the text as LOTM 1. 
63 Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy [1970], (ed.) R. Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 9. 
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unfinished theory of judgment (LOTM 1, 215–16).64 An even more important difference with regard 
to the Heideggerian approach is Arendt’s evaluation of Roman thought. Despite her emphasis on 
the Greek prephilosophical polis ideals, it is the Romans that are for her “perhaps the most political 
people we have known,” imbued with an “extraordinary political sense” (HC, 7, 59). This, however, 
is partly because of the Romans’ general disregard for political philosophy and for theory in general; 
their “only great philosopher” in the canonic sense was Augustine (ibid., 59).65 The political ideals and 
the state religion of the Romans were based upon an overriding sense of the authority of the tradition 
that undermined the role of critical thinking and intellectual innovation; the founders and 
predecessors, maiores, were inherently superior to the more recent ones, and reverence for the 
interpersonal dimension superseded the theoretical pursuit of truth for its own sake.66 As a result of 
this general “anti-intellectualism,” the Romans had little influence on political theory as such.67 Thus, 
in Arendt’s reading, rather than simply a “modernity in antiquity,” Roman political culture was 
fundamentally antimodern in the sense of being conservative and backwards-looking. Paradoxically, 
however, it was precisely this specific type of conservatism that was picked up by the Enlightenment 
revolutionaries, for whom political progress ultimately consisted in a retrieval and institutional 
preservation of a lost beginning—in stark contrast to the totalitarian movements of the twentieth 
century, which precisely sought to dissolve all stable political institutions and constitutions into a 
restless and violent total mobilization of humanity. The Roman focus on political acts of 
foundation—the notion that “all decisive political changes in the course of Roman history were 
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reconstitutions, namely, …retrievance of the original act of foundation”68—makes the political praxis 
exemplified by Roman history the paradigmatic model for modern revolutions and their projects of 
political (re)constitution (LOTM 2, 210–14).69 
However, in spite of their fundamentally antitheoretical and political disposition, the Romans 
did, according to Arendt, make one decisive contribution to Western intellectual history, a 
contribution of crucial importance to the unfolding of modern thought. This contribution was due 
to the influence of Hellenistic philosophy—Stoicism, in particular—and was a central concern for 
Arendt in what became her last major intellectual project, namely, addressing the problem of the 
ethical and political function of thinking, and of the conversion of thinking into action, that emerged 
from her analysis of Adolf Eichmann’s “banal” totalitarian evil as consisting in a profound 
thoughtlessness, a striking lack of moral reflection (LOTM 1, 3–6). The discovery attributed by 
Arendt to Roman thinkers was essentially connected to the theme to which Arendt dedicated the 
second volume of her final, unfinished magnum opus, The Life of the Mind: willing, with its increasingly 
central role in modern philosophy. In a letter to Heidegger of July 26, 1974, Arendt notes that in her 
work, she has “assumed that Greek antiquity recognized neither willing nor the problem of freedom 
(as a problem)” and announces her intention to study the conceptual genealogy of the will starting 
from the Aristotelian proairesis, choice or preference.70 In the finalized volume on willing, she specifies 
her claim to say that the concept of will does not properly emerge in classical Greek but rather in 
Hellenistic, Roman, and Christian culture. Within theology, it was essentially discovered by the 
apostle Paul in the context of the perceived discord between the spiritual will to live in accordance 
with the law and the sinful inability of the flesh to do so (LOTM 2, 18, 63–73). 
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69 See also Arendt, On Revolution, 196–214. Cf. Connolly, “The Promise of the Classical Canon”; Miriam Leonard, 
“Arendt’s Revolutionary Antiquity,” Classical Philology, vol. 113, no. 1 (2018): 53–66. 
70 Arendt and Heidegger, Briefe 1925–1975, 250/211. 
25 
 
However, it is a near contemporary of Paul, the Stoic teacher Epictetus, whom Arendt credits 
with the discovery of the will in terms of rational argument. Epictetus, a former slave in Rome, 
identified as a philosopher, but in the Hellenistic-Stoic vein philosophy meant for him the art of 
living one’s life. In the art of living, it is not discursive reason (logos) as such but the “will” in the sense 
of rational choice (proairesis) that is supreme; the key to human flourishing is to choose not to pursue 
that which is not in one’s power and to focus one’s will on the attainment of an indifferent tranquility 
(ataraxia) with regard to the vicissitudes of the external world. Faced with worldly fortunes and 
misfortunes, all human beings are slaves, and freedom is only to be found within the self, in the 
ability to choose to make oneself mentally and spiritually invulnerable to external domination (ibid., 
73–84).71 Already in The Human Condition, Arendt describes the Hellenistic philosophical schools as 
varieties of “ancient world alienation…inspired by a deep mistrust of the world and moved by a 
vehement impulse to withdraw from worldly involvement…into the security of an inward realm in 
which the self is exposed to nothing but itself” (HC, 310). This was a project based on the 
identification of freedom and individual, subjective sovereignty (ibid., 234) and constitutes, Arendt 
points out, a conceptual reversal of the ancient notion according to which “man could liberate 
himself from necessity only through power over other men and he could be free only if he owned a 
place, a home in the world.”72 World-alienation is thus symptomatic of the loss of Roman political 
liberty in the imperial age.  
It is only in The Life of the Mind, however, that Arendt gives the Stoic discovery of the will a 
positive historical role as a specific “Roman answer” to the question “what makes us think?”—an 
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answer that deviates decisively from the classical Greek answer of Plato and Aristotle according to 
which philosophy starts from sheer disinterested wonder before beings and culminates in theoretical 
contemplation, as well as from the “Socratic” answer according to which what makes us think is our 
desire to be in concord with ourselves (LOTM 1, 141–51, 166–93). Citing Hegel’s remark that the 
general purport of Hellenistic philosophy was to render the soul indifferent to the real world, Arendt 
notes that the experience from which this conception of philosophy ultimately arises is not wonder 
at the presence of a meaningful reality but rather fear in the face of a hostile and unpredictable 
reality—a fundamental discord between the human being and her world. Such an experience is 
certainly not exclusively Roman, but it finds its first important expression in the Roman 
appropriation of Hellenistic thought, starting in the final tumultuous period of the Roman Republic 
with Lucretius and Cicero, culminating at the height of the imperial age with Epictetus and Marcus 
Aurelius, and finding its final climax at the end of the empire with Boethius. The merciless twists and 
turns of fortune and the fragility of political freedom threaten public participation and action, so all-
important for traditional Roman culture, with an ultimate futility; the philosophical remedy against 
and consolation for this threat is to be found in what Michel Foucault would call “technologies of 
the self,”73 that is, in ways of turning away from the shared world towards self-control and self-
constitution through rational willpower (ibid., 151–62). “Philosophy is called upon to compensate for 
the frustrations of politics and, more generally, of life itself…. To think along these lines means to 
act upon yourself—the only action left when all acting in the world has become futile” (ibid., 160–
61). 
For Arendt, this Hellenistic and Roman discovery of the will, of willpower in the sense of the 
capacity of thinking to move the agent to autonomous action, has an absolutely central significance 
for the key question of The Life of the Mind concerning the ethico-political relevance of thinking for 
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action: “Could the activity of thinking as such…be among the conditions that make men abstain 
from evil-doing or even actually ‘condition’ them against it?” (ibid., 5). The target of Arendt’s critique 
of modern voluntarism is precisely its insufficiently radical approach to the will; with the exception 
of John Duns Scotus, Arendt points out, even the thinkers who admit the existence of free will or 
go so far as to grant the will primacy over the intellect have been reluctant to face the fundamental 
contingency and unpredictability inherent in the concept of willing as a future-oriented faculty of freedom 
(LOTM 2, 3–51, 195–96). Something that is willed freely is never willed necessarily; future-oriented 
projects are chosen without constraint and can always be given up, they can always fail, and in any 
case their results and outcomes are never entirely predictable. In this sense, Arendt maintains, even 
Nietzsche, for Heidegger the metaphysician of the will par excellence, renounces the key condition for 
willing, namely, the open-endedness of time (ibid., 158–72). The Nietzschean eternal recurrence of 
the same as the basic self-referential dynamic of the will to power, its unceasing generation of change 
and novelty, is a cyclic movement that takes place only for its own sake and is ultimately devoid of 
any inherent aim or purpose, and therefore never attains anything genuinely new.  
In this sense, modern voluntarism has, in fact, forfeited the true legacy of the Roman spirit of 
active freedom, recapitulated in Augustine’s dictum “Initium…ut esset creatus est homo”74—the human 
being was created in order for there to be a beginning, a free initiative, or rather, as Arendt reads it, 
in order for there to be as many potential initiatives for new, unpredictable, and contingent projects 
as there are human beings (HC, 177; LOTM 2, 18, 108–10, 158).75 In order to truly grasp this human 
spontaneity, this capacity for freely initiating new ventures, another faculty of the mind must be 
studied, one equally ignored by the entire philosophical tradition: the faculty of judgment, the 
inherently ethical and political ability of thinking to produce opinions on the value of particular acts 
(LOTM 2, 195–217). Just as Kant, in order to bridge the gap between his first and second critiques, 
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between objective experience and the moral will, between the true and the good, needed a third 
critique on the judgment of taste, on the experience of beauty as the sensory manifestation of the 
good, Arendt needs a third volume on judgment to bridge the gap between the two previous volumes 
of The Life of the Mind on thinking and willing—to show in what way thinking, in the form of moral 
self-reflection or “conscience,” can guide the will and convert into action. Alas, her untimely death 
left this final volume unwritten. 
 
Conclusion 
The Hellenistic-Roman discovery of the will as a way of relating to a world experienced not as 
harmoniously meaningful but as hostile and unpredictable, as a faculty oriented to the open future 
rather than the given present and aiming at active transformation and implementation rather than 
receptive contemplation of truth, initiates the philosophical development leading to the modern 
metaphysics of subjectivity—which, according to Heidegger, culminates in the late modern 
metaphysics of the will and in the Nietzschean will to power as a ceaseless reconfiguration and 
revaluation without ultimate end or purpose. In this sense, for Heidegger and Arendt as for Hegel, 
Droysen, and Zeller, Hellenistic thought is a type of protomodernity in antiquity, the discovery of an 
autarkic realm of inner selfhood, of the freedom of subjectivity as opposed to the compulsion of 
external things. In short, the modern, Kantian subject as the tragically split citizen of the realms of 
noumenal freedom and phenomenal necessity76 would have its roots in Roman Hellenism. On this 
point, as we have seen, Hegel, Heidegger, and Arendt are fundamentally agreed, with Hegel and 
Arendt emphasizing that this transformation hinges on the dwindling of classical civic liberty. 
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Nonetheless, in contrast to Heidegger’s dismissive and deploring stance towards Hellenism, 
there is a reason to read Arendt, alongside Foucault’s later studies on the Hellenistic and Roman 
“care of the self,”77 as part of the twentieth-century rehabilitation of Hellenistic thought. For Arendt, 
the Stoic philosophy of the will is not simply the starting point for a now-exhausted metaphysical 
path ending in closure. Rather, the discovery of the will as a human capacity for making fresh starts, 
for engaging in unforeseen and unpredictable new ventures on the basis of free judgment, holds for 
Arendt a decisive potential for understanding the ethical and political relevance of thinking—a 
potential that the modern metaphysics of the will has failed to properly recognize and develop, but 
one that is resurfacing in the contemporary closure of the metaphysical tradition. 
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